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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

27 February 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
Director, National Security Agency

FROM : John N. McMahon  
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Polish Government Plans for Possible Soviet  
Military Intervention and Declaration of  
Martial Law

1. [Redacted] Comment: We have just acquired additional intelligence on Polish Government plans regarding possible Soviet military intervention and the declaration of Martial Law from the same reliable source with excellent access within the Polish military leadership who previously provided information on these subjects. See FIRDB-312/00339-81, TS #818020, dated 30 January 1981, and FIRDB-312/00531-81, TS #818052, dated 11 February 1981. This information is extremely source sensitive and therefore recipients should hold this report very closely.]

2. For almost a week prior to the VIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, which met on 9 February 1981, Kania, Jaruzelski and Moczar conducted confidential talks at Helenow (a center of the Ministry of National Defense) and in the office of the

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Minister of National Defense. According to General Janiszewski, Chief of the Office of the Council of Ministers, Kania and Moczar persuaded Jaruzelski to take over the duties of Prime Minister. On the eve of Jaruzelski's taking over the post of Prime Minister, General Molczyk, Vice Minister of National Defense, diplomatically went to the hospital.

3. Just before Jaruzelski was nominated Prime Minister, a special order of the Ministry of National Defense was prepared in which the Prime Minister reserved for himself the matters of defense doctrine (crucial defense objectives), universal defense duty (a statute of the Sejm deals with this matter), cadre and military representation matters. The remainder of the matters of administering the Ministry were supposed to be entrusted to General Siwicki, Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, as the unofficial chief of the Ministry. Division General Hupalowski, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, was supposed to be favored for the position of Chief of Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. However, the above decisions were not put into effect and currently Prime Minister Jaruzelski continues to run the entire Ministry of Defense.

4. Prior to the VIII Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, a group of 18 generals, all deputies and assistants to Marshal Kulikov, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Armed Forces, made an unscheduled trip to Poland. This group of 18 generals was under the leadership of General of the Army Gribkov, Chief of Staff of the Combined Armed Forces. General Siwicki was not informed of this visit until literally on the eve of it, and Jaruzelski only learned about the visit from Siwicki. The visit of the Soviet general officers took place under the pretext of checking preparations for the "SOYUZ-81" Warsaw Pact CPX exercise. However, in reality the visit was a sounding, both open and concealed, of the morale and political state of the Polish Armed Forces.

5. The Soviet generals visited every branch of service, including down to division and regiment level. In the 1st Mechanized Regiment at Wesola an incident took place when General of the Army Shcheglov, senior Soviet

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Warsaw Pact representative in Poland, asked the commander of the regiment the question, "What will be your action in the event it becomes necessary to remove the strikers from the plant?" General Siwicki, who was present there, immediately reacted strongly, stating that the question was addressed to the wrong person. A sharp exchange of opinions ensued during which Shcheglov stated that he does not share the views of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces and disagrees with him.

6. At the conclusion of the visit talks and a reception were held at the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces under the auspices of Jaruzelski. During the visit at the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces General Gribkov proposed that in order to show strength, a large squadron of Soviet naval ships be dispatched for a visit to Polish ports beginning on 16 February. At the same time, General Gribkov proposed that an exercise ("DRUZHBA") be held involving Polish and Soviet troops as well as an exercise of elements of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, the Polish Navy, and the navy of the GDR. Originally the troop exercise called for the participation of the 11th Armored Division of the Polish Armed Forces from Zagan and a Soviet tank division from Borne Sulinowo. However, General Gribkov proposed to exchange the 11th Armored Division for the 10th Armored Division from Opole. This division would move through major cities, including Wroclaw, Poznan and Zielona Gora on a northwestern axis, while the Soviet tank division from Borne Sulinowo would move from the north on a southeastern axis.

7. Within the framework of the exercises of the fleets, an amphibious landing of Combined Amphibious Forces of the Polish Armed Forces, Soviet forces and National Peoples Army of the GDR would be executed (one battalion from each armed forces) in the vicinity of Swinoujscie, followed by an embarking and sea lift to Kolobrzeg where partial disembarking and further troop movements would take place.

8. On 14 February subsequent reconnaissance groups of Soviet generals arrived in Legnica, Poland, from the USSR, probably from the Moscow Military District. One of these groups was accompanied by General Leon Szyszko,

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Chief Specialist of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. Based on highly confidential information which Source received, it is apparent that the Soviets are making thorough preparations for military intervention in Poland. It was established that during the reconnaissance the Soviets plan to deploy at least two divisions (probably the 21st and 22nd Mechanized Divisions) among others in the environs of Warsaw. One of them is to be deployed in the area of Pyry south of Warsaw, and the other in the area of Puszcza Kampinowska. The commander of one of these reconnaissance groups shared the following doubts with General Szyszko over a drink, saying openly: "We can deploy troops at the places of work, block them, but what next? How do you force people to work?" General Szyszko called his attention to the fact that there is a basic difference in the conduct of the current reconnaissance groups and the reconnaissance groups that visited Poland during the period 4-5 December 1980. [redacted] Comment: For details on the activities of the Soviet reconnaissance in Poland in December 1980, see Source's report on this subject dated 5 December 1980, entitled: "Plans for Warsaw Pact Intervention in Poland on 8 December".] The difference is that the December 1980 reconnaissance was done hastily and superficially. Currently, however, the Soviet reconnaissance groups are studying in greater detail local construction developments, terrain, roads, barriers, travel times, etc. Warsaw itself was very comprehensively evaluated. The current Soviet group even indicated that it was necessary to study where the military commandant's Headquarters could be situated. (Source does not know which building was being considered.)

9. After Jaruzelski assumed the duties of the Prime Minister, on the strong insistence of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces and in effect on the proposal of the Prime Minister, the Soviet side agreed to call off the visit of a naval squadron to Gdynia.

10. According to the latest agreements, the Warsaw Pact CPX exercise "SOYUZ-81" is supposed to start on 16 March and last approximately 7-10 days. According to estimated data of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, approximately 150,000 Warsaw Pact troops may participate in the exercise, of which about 30,000 will be on Polish territory. Of the Soviet Armed Forces, only front and field army staffs with signal and support units

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and very few combat troops are supposed to enter Poland. In the final phase of the exercise staffs of two Polish Armed Forces field armies are supposed to deploy in the southeastern portion of the GDR.

11. There exists serious uneasiness among the leadership of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, who realize the danger of transforming an exercise into a pre-planned military intervention, and delicate efforts are being made for cancelling or minimizing "SOYUZ-81" activities on Polish territory.

12.  Comment: The following information on Polish planning regarding the possible declaration of Martial Law supplements that provided by Source in the reports referenced in Paragraph 1 above.] Currently, a concept for overcoming the crisis by means of declaring Martial Law is being urgently prepared in the event the crisis intensifies--with the intention of presenting it to the Soviet side (possibly while in Moscow during the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). Preparations in this field were strongly accelerated just before the VIII Plenum. A decision-making exercise in this matter was conducted on 16 February. The exercise was directed by Minister of Internal Affairs Milewski and Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces Siwicki.

13. The report on the results of the exercise was presented to Prime Minister Jaruzelski on 20 February, and on the same day was discussed at the Presidium of the Government of the Polish Peoples Republic. Jaruzelski personally made several minor corrections and ordered preparation of an information document on the state of preparedness of the country for introducing the state of Martial Law and on the decision-making exercise on this subject, which is supposed to be presented to the Soviet side in Moscow or in Poland (Source Comment: Perhaps at Walcz at a separate secret meeting devoted to these matters).

14. In the supplement ordered by the Prime Minister, they finally added in the preamble that: "As a result of the developed crisis situation in Poland, a directing staff has been appointed, headed by the Prime Minister, and composed of the Secretary of the Central Committee, Polish United Workers' Party, Vice-Premier Jagielski, and ministers

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of the leading ministries. The staff held a number of meetings during which developments of the events in Poland were thoroughly analyzed and courses of action were laid out for the organs of authority and state administration in a crisis situation.

15. Under Martial Law, the Ministry of Internal Affairs envisages conducting a so-called operation "WIOSNA" ("SPRING")--that is, internment of political opponents and activists of Solidarnosc six-to-twelve hours before declaring Martial Law. Minister Milewski stated that: "Declaration of Martial Law could be the greatest tragedy in Polish history and for this reason should be treated as the last resort." More hard-headed are General Ciaston, Colonel Pawlikowski and the Commandant of the Civil Militia of Warsaw.

16. Under provisions of Martial Law, the troops will act with more caution, at most as a supporting force, deployed close to cities and blocking industrial centers.

17. [Source Comment: The new leadership with Jaruzelski approaches this problem very seriously, treating this step as possibly the last straw before the Soviet intervention. The Kania-Jaruzelski team, which according to all indications was joined by Moczar, is not the team which Moscow would like to have in Poland.] Soviet General of the Army Shcheglov's contempt for Jaruzelski and Siwicki and in general for the present team is also a matter of common knowledge.

18. At present the situation is quiet. Jaruzelski confirmed that rumors are circulating that the Soviets do not want to accept the above-mentioned solutions. In the offices of the Minister of National Defense and the Council of Ministers Source sensed signs which indicated that the arrangements were calculated to be for a rather short period of time.

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